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The appeal in Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Carmichael [2018] EWCA Civ 
548, gets to the heart of a long-standing tension between the Ôdistinctive philosophyÕ of 
tribunals in granting Ôordinary peopleÕ access to justice in social security provision, and the 
tendency of those that sit on them to Ôlament their impotence to assist the needyÕ (Baldwin et 
al, 1991, pp.96-102). The question before the court was a wide-reaching one: when a tribunal 
is faced with secondary legislation that is an unlawful breach of a claimantÕs human rights, 
can it disapply the offending provision in the assessment of their benefit entitlement? In 
deciding that this would have Ôexceeded what is permissibleÕ (para.67) the Court of Appeal 
sided with lamentable impotence. 
After an outline of the case, this comment reflects on two key elements of the courtÕs 
reasoning: (i) the distinction in treatment between primary and secondary legislation, and (ii) 
the CourtÕs assessment of the Ôdiscretionary housing paymentÕ scheme (DHPs). I argue that 
the implication of this decision is to render the claimantÕs right under s.7(1)(b) Human Rights 
Act 1998 to Ôrely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedingsÕ 
entirely illusory. 
The claimants in this case were affected by the Coalition GovernmentÕs ÔRemoval of the 
Spare Room SubsidyÕ Ð known commonly as the Ôbedroom taxÕ Ð which imposes a housing 
benefit penalty to those deemed to be under-occupying their properties in the social rented 
sector. The underlying regulations assumed that couples share a room, but this was not 
possible due to Mrs CarmichaelÕs disabilities. Consequently, a penalty was imposed on their 
housing benefit Ð 14% of the eligible rent for the property Ð leaving them reliant on applying 
to the local authority administered DHP scheme for support. The facts may well be familiar 
to readers; this is the same Carmichael family as in the series of high profile Ôbedroom taxÕ 
judicial review challenges, culminating in their successful appeal in R. (on the application of 
Carmichael) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2016] UKSC 58. Having been 
unsuccessful in the earlier instance decision of R. (on the application of MA) v Secretary of 
State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 13, the Carmichaels ran a parallel appeal on 
the application of Reg.B13(5)(a) Housing Benefit Regulations 2006 to their housing benefit 
award at the First-Tier Tribunal under s.6 Sch.7 Child Support, Pensions and Social Security 
Act 2000. It is this route which is our focus here. 
Their argument mirrored that of the judicial review challenges Ð the housing authorityÕs 
application of Reg.B13(5)(a) was unlawfully discriminatory under Article 14, taken with 
A1P1. The nuance of their position was, however, that the exercise of justification under a 
statutory appeal is different from that under a judicial review challenge in the administrative 
courts. The First-Tier Tribunal agreed, finding that the decision to apply Reg.B13 should be 
set aside and Ð controversially Ð under s.3 Human Rights Act 1998, the offending regulation 
should be read with the additional words 'one member of a couple who is unable to share a 
bedroom because of his or her disability'. 
On appeal, the Upper-Tier Tribunal held that the First-Tier had clearly overreached their 
interpretive duty under s.3 Human Rights Act 1998; the offending provision could not be 
read in a convention compliant manner and the insertion of additional words was to rewrite it. 
However, following Mathieson v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 47, 
in the context of secondary legislation a First-Tier Tribunal should not Ôgive effectÕ to 
regulations which they determine are incompatible with convention rights. To apply the 
penalty would result in a clear breach of the CarmichaelÕs convention rights contrary to s.6(1) 
Human Rights Act 1998 and leave them no recourse but a free-standing claim for damages 
for the breach under s.8(2). As the tribunal observed, Mr Eadie QC, acting for the Secretary 
of State, Ôhad the good grace to accept that this might not appear to be a particularly attractive 
argument, given the funding complications' (para.55). 
Given the broad-ranging implications of the decision, an appeal was inevitable. The Secretary 
of State argued that the Upper-Tier Tribunal (i) was wrong to find that it could disapply the 
regulation, and (ii) had failed to have regard to the provision of DHPs. In the present case, the 
majority of the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal on both grounds. Lord Justice Flaux 
determined that there was not Ôany material differenceÕ (para.46) between the approaches in 
the first and upper tiers; both were re-writing legislation when they should instead have 
Ôlimited itself to determining that [Reg.B13] as it stood was incompatibleÕ (para.67). 
Mathieson could be distinguished as the Carmichaels had been in receipt of DHPs and their 
remedy therefore lies solely Ôin bringing a claim for damagesÕ under s.8(2) Human Rights 
Act 1998 (para. 67). Sir Brian Leveson P agreed, with Lord Justice Leggatt dissenting on the 
first ground, determining that the tribunals had the power to disapply the regulations, but in 
exercising their discretion to do so under s.8(1) Human Rights Act 1998 Act, had failed to 
have regard to the provision made by way of DHPs (para. 102). 
There are two key issues that are worth underscoring here. First, the majority of the court 
were not persuaded that the position of secondary legislation which is not convention 
compliant, where its incompatibility does not arise from its enabling Act, is significantly 
different to where its provisions are the inevitable consequence of primary legislation. Put 
another way, where secondary legislation conferring welfare benefits is noncompliant, the 
tribunal is bound to apply it regardless, notwithstanding its subordinate status. It is on this 
issue that Lord Justice Leggatt dissents, underscoring that s.6(2) Human Rights Act 1998 
provides such a distinction (para.79) and to regard the tribunal as Ôexceed[ing] what was 
permissibleÕ (para.67) is to Ôdisregard the distinction between primary and subordinate 
legislationÕ (para. 78).  Akin to circumstances where secondary legislation is ultra vires, it is 
not necessary to Ôidentify words which can be deleted with an imaginary blue pencilÕ (para. 
87), it is enough to recognise that for the tribunal to enforce the offending provision in the 
assessment of benefit entitlement would be contrary to s.6(1) Human Rights Act 1998. 
This issue gets to the root of the First-Tier TribunalÕs role in holding the administration of 
social security regulations to account. For the majority of the court to pull the Ônotoriously 
labyrinthineÕ (Harris, 2013, p.14) patchwork of secondary legislation that governs the 
payment of benefits to sit alongside the overarching, principle-setting primary legislation Ð 
here the Welfare Reform Act 2012 Ð is to absolve s.6 Human Rights Act 1998 of any 
meaningful effect on social security legislation. If the Ôdistinctive philosophyÕ of the tribunals 
is to bring the assertion of rights closer to claimants in need (Baldwin et al, 1991, p. 96), it is 
difficult to see how the residual right to seek damages under s.8(2), with the funding 
challenges this inevitably carries with it, is a satisfactory answer. 
Second, the CourtÕs faith on the provision of DHPs as a distinguishing factor is characteristic 
of judgments relating to housing benefit reform. Indeed, on behalf of the Secretary of State, 
Mr Eadie argued that to concentrate on the regulations themselves would be a Ômisplaced 
focus on entitlementÕ (para.38). I would suggest that the deficiencies of the scheme identified 
in Burnip v Birmingham City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 629 (para. 46) and underscored by 
the UKUT in the earlier instance Ð namely, that these payments are often time-limited, paid 
from a capped fund, and cannot be relied upon Ð demonstrate the importance of such a focus 
on entitlement as opposed to one on this floating layer of discretionary support (Meers, 
2018). When the Court determines that the violation has been accounted for by these 
payments, as Ôno loss has been sufferedÕ (para. 67), the inability of the scheme to be relied 
upon to service a deduction indefinitely is neglected. 
In deciding that the tribunal should have properly limited itself to Ôdetermining that 
[Reg.B13] as it stood was incompatibleÕ (para.67), leaving the Carmichaels with a remedy 
rooted solely in Ôbringing a claim for damagesÕ under s.8(2) of the Human Rights Act 1998, it 
is difficult to see how the promise to rely on convention rights in Ôany legal proceedingsÕ 
(s.7(1)(b)) is satisfied, nor the requirement of the tribunal to act pursuant to s.6(1)(b). 
Notwithstanding a clear breach of their convention rights, the tribunal must still apply the 
offending secondary regulation, even when it is not the inevitable consequence of primary 
legislation. The judgment speaks to longstanding concerns about the ambit of the tribunal 
system and whether the social entitlement chamber has sufficient teeth to uphold the rights of 
the ordinary people it seeks to serve. In the context of broader debates on impediments to 
human rights enforcement, perhaps best reflected in the Joint Committee on Human Rights 
ongoing inquiry into the matter (2018), this judgment will be unwelcome by those tribunal 
judges who Ôlament their impotence to assist the needyÕ (Baldwin et al, 1991, pp.96-102). 
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